The invasion of Normandy was a total surprise for almost all of the Nazi
commanders.
This map shows the zones that the German high command considered the most
probable for an invasion of Europe.
The Allied command succeeded in tricking the enemy, pretending that Operation
Fortitude was in preparation, commanded by General Patton, aimed at liberating
Norway.
The deception also based itself on the prestige of Patton. The Germans regarded
him one of the best commanders on the field and considered that with his
impetuousness he would certainly have participated in the initial phases of the
invasion.
Fortitude consisted in corps, divisions, regiments and battalions stationed in
the north of Great Britain and existed only on paper and in radio
communications. Fake quarters, hangars, and every type of means were
constructed to create a visual confirmation of the radio communications to the
Germans. They come to believe what they are naturally induced to believe; the
rigidity and the lack of democracy within the command structure did the rest,
limiting and discouraging the discussion between the different levels of rank
and of organization.
If in war it is possible to outline an operation of "Maskirovka" (Russian word
that means "camouflage"), it is fundamental to determine if it has had success,
especially when deception is the presupposition for an operation as vital as
"Overlord." The Allies could count on Ultra, a decoding system capable of
deciphering the major part of German messages, which were exchanged with the
system Enigma. Moreover, all the Nazi agents in Great Britain had been singled
out and forced to collaborate. By these and other means, the Allies were able
to deceive the enemy and to have a good degree of confidence in believing that
the real operation would enjoy a surprise effect.
The Germans also believed that a landing on the European continent had to take
place at Pas de Calais, the closest point between England and France. They were
so convinced that the Allies would have landed on that point that for many of
the initial hours of D-Day they continued to consider the landing in Normandy a
diversion, organized to take away the attention from the true objective of the
invasion.
As landing alternatives more plausible than Normandy, the port of Brest and the
Bay of Biscay were considered.
Perhaps today these considerations seem absolutely and clearly mistaken if not
ridiculous, considering that in 1942 the Allies had carried out a raid in
Dieppe, which concluded with a disaster: that should have suggested to the
Germans that the Allies would have difficultly attempted an assault on a
fortified port like Brest. Moreover, an adversary searches with difficulty to
strike where most obvious, crossing the English Channel to Pas de Calais.
Finally, even if Norway was vital for Germany for its iron that supplied the
war industry, and because there were situated the departure bases for the
German submarines, it was not an objective as important for the Allies, not
comparable to an invasion conducted directly toward the European continent.
The German command, from Hitler traveling down the chain of command down to the
commanders on the field with few exceptions, tended to have to much faith in
its own information and in its own past experience. In short it was too secure
of itself. Despite that the impossibility of winning the war was evident to
many, they were unwilling to abandon an attitude of superiority toward the
enemy.
They would be deceived and defeated.